This paper investigates the relationship between education and employerprovided training, both on -the -job and off -the -job, using a unique dataset drawn from a survey of Thai employees conducted in the summer of 2001. We find a negative and statistically significant relationship between educational attainment and on -the -job training (OJT) and a positive and statistically significant relationship between education and off -the -job training (OFFJT). Since the marginal monetary returns to OJT increase with education, the negative relationship between education and OJT requires that the marginal costs of OJT are higher for the better educated. This is the case if the opportunity costs of the time spent receiving OJT increase with educational attainment.
Introduction
The economic literature stresses the importance of schooling in increasing productivity. Schooling can affect productivity both directly, by improving basic skills, and indirectly, by influencing training. Are the better educated more likely to receive employer -provided training? A positive association between education and training stimulates individual productivity but has the unpleasant implication that initial differences in the individual level of human capital are amplified in the labor market.
In a recent review of empirical studies on employer -provided training in the US and the UK, Blundell et al, 1999 , conclude that the answer to the question above is positive and emphasize the strong complementarity between the three main components of human capital -early ability, formal education and training. In another review, Leuven, 2002 , considers as an empirical regularity the finding that more educated workers participate more in training than less educated individuals.
One reason why the better educated receive more training is that they are easier to train (see Blondal and al, 2002) . According to Thurow, 1975 and Rosen, 1976, education improves learning skills and reduces (marginal) training costs. Since optimal investment in training occurs when marginal costs are equal to marginal benefits, a reduction in marginal costs increases investment 1 .
The empirical relationship between education and training can vary, however, with the type of training. Lynch, 1992 , uses US data to distinguish between on -the -job training (OJT) and off -the -job training (OFFJT) and finds that education is positively and significantly related to the latter type of training, but unrelated to the former type. Focusing on the concept of over-education -which occurs when workers are in occupations that require less schooling than they actually have - Sicherman, 1990 , finds that over-educated individuals receive less OJT than individuals with lower education and interprets this result as evidence that education and OJT are substitutes in the production of human capital. Since over-educated workers are more likely to quit and move to a more suitable job, employers are less willing to train them in firm -specific skills. Hersch, 1991, obtains similar results and argues that the over-educated are less willing, or less able, to learn than individuals with the suitable level of education.
The existing empirical studies focus mainly on developed countries. Schooling and training, however, are of great importance in developing countries not only for productivity growth but also for improving health and nutrition and reducing fertility and income inequality (see Berhman, 1987 Berhman, , 1999 . The current paper investigates the relationship between education and employer -provided training in Thailand, using the results of a survey of Thai employees conducted by a team led by one of the authors during the summer of 2001. The survey is a case study of 1737 employees belonging to 20 large firms operating in four selected industries in the Bangkok area. These employees filled a questionnaire especially designed to elicit information on earnings, education, training events and family background.
We follow Lynch and distinguish in our investigation between OJT and OFFJT.
The former is carried out in the workplace and is likely to be more specific in its contents than the latter, which takes place in the classroom either within or outside the firm 2 . Our key finding is that the relationship between education and training depends on the type of training, and is positive in the case of OFFJT and negative in the case of OJT. Therefore, in our sample of Thai employees, the participation to OFFJT amplifies the skill gap induced by differences in educational attainment, and the participation to OJT compensates these differences.
To explain our results, we follow human capital theory and define equilibrium training as the investment which equalizes the marginal cost to the marginal benefit of training. Our estimates suggest that the marginal monetary benefits of both types of training -evaluated at sample average education -are mildly increasing in training investment. Therefore, a stable training equilibrium requires that the marginal costs of training increase with training investment, and at a faster speed. Now suppose to start from equilibrium and to increase educational attainment marginally above average attainment: a new equilibrium with lower OJT for the marginally better educated can only be obtained if the marginal costs of this type of training increase with education. In contrast, since OFFJT is higher for the better educated, the fact that the marginal benefits of OFFJT increase with education does not impose any particular restriction on the relationship between the marginal costs of training and educational attainment.
One possible explanation of our findings is that better educated individuals are more efficient at learning skills off -the -job, but less efficient at learning onthe -job. An alternative, and we believe more plausible explanation, is that individuals with higher education are more productive, and therefore have a higher opportunity cost of the time they spend receiving training.
The empirical setup
When training is provided by the firm, a basic tenet of human capital theory is that the privately optimal investment is attained when the marginal costs of training, incurred by the firm during the training period, are equal to the marginal benefits, which spread from the current period to the entire duration of the employment relationship. Using F for the flow of OFFJT and O for the flow of OJT, training incidence or intensity can be characterized in a compact way as follows
where Y is a vector of controls, both time varying and time invariant, μ is a time invariant individual effect, ε are random errors and the relationship between years of schooling E and training is made explicit. where X is a vector of controls,
is the stock of OFFJT, . After conditioning on family background and the province of birth, however, residual ability could still be correlated with educational attainment. Therefore, we need instrumental variables. Let educational attainment E be given by
where Z is a vector of exogenous variables, which includes individual characteristics such as gender and a third order polynomial in age, family background variables and province of birth dummies, plus at least one variable omitted from equations
. 4 We are grateful to one referee for bringing this issue to our attention. 5 When the interviewed individual is the oldest, we use the educational attainment of the second oldest sibling. 6 Although the survey was conducted in the vicinity of Bangkok, the sample employees are originally from 56 (out of 79) different provinces of the country. Regional disparities in income and education attainment are large.
Our instruments for educational attainment -which we omit from the training and earnings equations -are order at birth, a dummy taking the value 1 if the individual is the oldest son or daughter and 0 otherwise, the age of the mother at birth and its interaction with order at birth. These variables capture household preferences in the decision to provide education to the offspring, and are not related in any obvious way to unobserved ability, once we have conditioned for parental education, the number of siblings and province of birth. For instance, the older son/daughter can have priority in the allocation of the resources devoted by the household to education. Moreover, very young mothers may value education of the offspring relatively less than more senior parents. We focus on the mother rather than on the father because the age of the former at the time of birth of the interviewed individual is less likely to be correlated with available household resources -and nutrition -than the age of the latter, due to the lower labor force participation of women and/or to the less accentuated life-cycle pattern of female earnings.
We fit years of education on the variables included in the vector Z and use the Bound F -test to verify whether the selected instruments are jointly significant in the first stage regression. Following Smith and Blundell [1986] , we also compute residuals and add them to the explanatory variables in [1] and [2] , in order to test whether education can be treated as weakly exogenous with respect to training.
The data
The employee survey on which our empirical investigation is based covers firms belonging to four sectors in manufacturing industry: food processing, auto parts, hard disk drive makers and computer components. The latter two industries are high tech and dominated by subsidiaries of foreign manufacturers. Thailand is one of the largest production locations for hard disk drives and related components, and this industry is one of the country's major exporters (see Doner and Brimble [1998] ). The former two industries use more labor intensive production technologies and include a substantial share of domestic firms. Despite being hi-tech, HDD and computer firms are also fairly labor intensive, as production gets outsourced in Thailand from abroad to take advantage of the favorable price of labor.
The selection of these industries provides a reasonable coverage of Thai industry without pretending to produce a statistically representative sample. Due to the budget constraint, we have restricted our attention to firms with plants located in the Greater Bangkok area and with more than 100 employees. Firms in the four industries were approached and asked to cooperate to the survey. Overall, 20 firms agreed to cooperate, 5 in food processing, 5 in auto parts, 6 in personal computers and 4 in the HDD industry. The firms in the sample have more than 100 employees (more than 1000 in the HDD industry). After restricting our sample to production workers, technicians and engineers, we stratified employment in each firm by age and education and randomly sampled employees within each cell, using larger weights for smaller firms. The collected data provide the material for a case study of training in Thai private industry. We have already pointed out that the dataset is not a statistically representative sample, both because of the selection of industries and because of the endogenous selection associated with the participation of firms to the project.
These limits, induced mainly by financial constraints, must be weighted against the advantages, which include the collection of detailed current and retrospective information on family background, education and different types of training.
Compared to the Thai labor force, our sample is substantially more educated. Table 1 shows the distribution of employment by education and industry in the data (columns 1 to 4) and in the total labor force (column 5). The share of employees with primary education in our sample is close to zero in three industries out of four and significantly different from zero only in the food processing industry. In
Thailand as a whole, this share is as high as 75 percent. College graduates are 45 percent of all employees in the personal computers industry and only 9 percent in the national average. These drastic differences can be explained with the fact that we are selecting firms with more than 100 employees and a young labor force -as younger cohorts in medium to large firms are more educated than average.
Moreover, the national average includes agricultural employment, where average educational attainment is very low 7 . Table 2 presents the summary statistics of a selection of variables in the survey for the year 2001, separately for males and females. We notice that the average age of sampled employees is about 28 years, and that there are more females than males in the sample, which partly reflects the already mentioned fact that females take the largest share of labor in Thai export -oriented firms. Notes: Wage: nominal monthly wage in baths; OJT incidence = dummy equal to 1 if any OJT training occurred in year h; OFFJT incidence = dummy equal to 1 if any OFFJT training occurred in year h; OJT intensity = average duration of OJT in hours per month; OFFJT intensity = average duration of OFFJT in hours per month; cumulated OJT= sum of OJT intensity from 1998 to year h; cumulated OFFJT = sum of OFFJT intensity from 1998 to year h; father's and mother's education = 1: higher than primary; 0: primary or less; oldest sibling's education = % with college degree; previous experience in 1998: labor market experience net of tenure in 1998.
Average age of sampled employees is about 28 years, and average tenure in 1998, the start of the reference period, is about 2 and a half years for males and over 3 years for females. Previous labor market experience recorded at the start of the period, and defined as the time spent in the labor market since labor market entry minus current tenure, is close to 2 years for both males and females. The vast majority of the employees in the survey is composed of individuals who have started their current spell and their labor market experience before 1998. For these individuals, tenure and experience after 1998 are equal to tenure and experience in 1998 plus a linear trend.
The survey asks individuals about their highest attained degree. We convert the answers in years of education by applying to each degree the required number of years of schooling 9
. Average years of attained education in the sample is 12.90 years for males and 10.66 years for females and are significantly higher than attained years in the Thai population.
We collect information both about on -the -job (OJT) and off -the -job (OFFJT) training provided by the firm after probation. Probation in Thailand lasts up to a maximum of six months, and training during probation is typically highly structured and standardized within each firm. Therefore, we expect little variation in training incidence and intensity during probation within firms, and virtually no variation once we control for firm effects, as we do in our training regressions
10
. On -the -job training is carried out in the workplace by senior employees, supervisors or instructors and focuses on the performance of daily tasks. By and large, this type of training tends to be more informal and ad hoc 11 than off -the -job training. In the survey, we explicitly exclude learning by doing and learning from watching others because it is virtually impossible to distinguish these activities from regular work.
Off -the -job training is organized by the firm either in or outside the premises, and either during or after standard working hours. While OJT is provided mainly by senior workers in the same unit, team leaders and foremen (72% of the total), OFFJT is supplied mainly by instructors from professional training centers and from outside the company (86% of the total) and concerns both daily tasks, 9 We set 0 years for no education, 6 years for primary, 9 years for lower secondary, 12 years for upper secondary and lower vocational, 14 years for upper vocational and 16 years for college or more. 10 Another reason for excluding training during probation is that training programs for newly hired employees are conducted mostly before their assignment to a particular section or unit in the firm. We have defined OJT as the training taking place at the regular workplace -opposed to OFFJT, which takes place outside the regular workplace. This distinction does not make sense for new recruits.
11 Informal training is difficult to measure. See the discussion in Barron et al, 1997, and Spletzer, 1994. instruction for the operation of machines and tools, quality control and standards and safety regulations.
For each type of training, we asked whether the employee has had any training during the reference period, a simple (0,1) dummy, and about training intensity. We call the former variable OJT incidence for on -the -job training and Turning to family background, we present in the table summary statistics on the father's and mother's education, the education of the oldest sibling (next to oldest if the employee is the oldest) and the number of siblings. For ease of presentation, the information on the former two variables is recoded to generate two (0,1) dummies, with 0 referring to primary education or less and 1 referring to higher education. The education of the oldest sibling is expressed as the percentage of individuals with a college degree. It turns out that male employees, who have higher educational attainment than females, have also a "better" family background, since both parents and the oldest sibling have on average higher education and the number of siblings is smaller. Table 3 shows the means of the same variables separately for production workers and for team leaders, foremen, technicians and engineers. As expected, the latter group is better educated than the former and receives more formal OFFJT and less OJT. In the questionnaire we also ask whether OFFJT training was carried out in the establishment premises or outside it, either in a training center, at a supplier or at a parent firm. It turns out that training outside the establishment premises is more frequent for technicians and engineers. 
The results
We present the estimates of training incidence and intensity and of the Mincerian earnings function in two separate sub-sections. A third sub-section is devoted to the discussion and interpretation of results.
Training Incidence and Intensity
We estimate a bi-probit model for OJT and OFFJT incidence and a tobit model for OJT and OFFJT intensity, after pooling all available observations over the period . We present our estimates in Tables 5 and 6, which are organized in four columns: in the former two columns we treat years of education as exogenous, and in the latter two columns we test the weak exogeneity of education by using the test devised by Blundell and Smith, 1986. We implement the weak exogeneity test by regressing years of education in 2001 on the vector Z and by computing the residuals RES. . Table 5 focuses on training incidence and shows that individuals with higher education are less likely to receive OJT and more likely to receive OFFJT. We also find that the probability of receiving training increases with age. The effects of 15 These trends also capture the time varying effects of experience and tenure. 16 With panel data, one might expect that the error term is correlated across individuals. With Stata, robust standard errors are easily computed for the bi-probit model. Since this option is not available for the tobit model, we bootstrap standard errors, using 50 replications of the estimates. Bootstrapping uses Monte Carlo simulation to adjust standard errors. See Wooldridge, 2002. 17 Under the null hypothesis that residuals are not statistically different from zero we do not have to adjust standard errors for the presence of generated regressors. See Blundell and Smith, 1986. tenure and experience vary with the type of training, and are negative for OJT and positive for OFFJT. Finally, female employees are significantly more likely to receive OJT. Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses, with p<0.10= *, p<0.05 = **, p<0.01 = ***. Nobs: number of observations. Each regression includes firm dummies, family background variables and a linear and a quadratic trend. ρ =correlation between training error terms. Sex=1: males; sex=0: females. Table 6 looks at training intensity and confirms the relationship between education, OJT and OFFJT. The estimates in Tables 5 and 6 refer to the overall effect of education on training, which includes both the direct effect and the effect which operates via the allocation of individuals to jobs and positions. One would like to know, however, whether an individual endowed with higher formal education who fills a given position will receive more or less OJT or OFFJT. To answer this question we need to hold constant the type of position, for clearly different positions have different degrees of training, both in extent and type. Notes: see Table 5 . Bootstrapped standard errors (50 replications) in parentheses.
We control for the position held by restricting our sample to production workers, and by excluding team leaders, foremen and other positions. The results reported in Tables 7 and 8 confirm the qualitative findings of Tables 5 and 6 , with the only exception that the positive effect of education on OFFJT is not statistically significant in the case of training incidence. Notes: see Table 5 . Notes: see Table 6 .
Our estimates use four years of retrospective data. A drawback of these data is that they introduce measurement error, as respondents may suffer from recollection problems, which are expected to increase with the period of time between the training spell and the interview and with the detail of the training question (see Leuven, 2002) . To minimize the influence of these measurement errors and check the robustness of our results, we replicate Tables 5 and 6 
The Mincerian equation
Our measure of earnings is monthly net earnings including overtime pay in January of each year. The stock of training at time t is defined as the sum of average monthly hours of training from 1998 to the calendar year t-1. Therefore, we associate in [3] wages in year t with the training undertaken up to year t-1, and treat the latter as a predetermined variable. As in the case of the training equations, we pool the available information and include in the vector of controls X firm dummies and a linear and a quadratic trend. Since we estimate [3] using fixedeffects, the coefficients associated to time invariant variables, such as education, gender, tenure and experience in 1998, cannot be estimated. Moreover, the inclusion of trends precludes the identification of age effects. Our results in Table 9 are organized in four columns. In the former two columns we assume that unobserved and time invariant talent does not affect the private returns to training
18 Results are available from the authors upon request.
and estimate [3] on the full sample and on the sub-sample of production workers using fixed -effects. In the latter two columns we allow private returns to training to be affected by unobserved talent and replace the observed years of education with the predicted years from the estimate of equation [4] . By so doing, we combine fixed effects with instrumental variables 19 . respectively. According to Psacharopoulos [1994] , the private returns to an additional year of education in Thailand is close to 10 percent, about half the size of the returns to an additional year of OJT and about the size of the returns to OFFJT.
Our estimates of the returns to training are lower than those obtained for the US by root of training rather than training, with no substantial qualitative change in the results. 20 The mean number of hours of instruction received per year by pupils older than 14 in the US was 1032 in 1991. Source: OECD, Education at a Glance, Paris 1992. 21 We do not include in the computation of the returns to OJT and OFFJT the return to tenure and labor market experience, because upward sloping earnings profiles are not necessarily generated by investments in human capital.
Discussion
In summary, we find that the relationship between education and training is positive, as expected, for OFFJT and negative for OJT. How do we explain these results? As anticipated in the introduction, a useful starting point is the definition of equilibrium investment in training as the level of investment which equalizes the marginal costs and the marginal benefits of training. Our estimates of the Mincerian earnings function suggest that the marginal returns to both types of trainingevaluated at the sample mean value of education -are increasing in the level of training. Therefore, a stable equilibrium in the training market requires that (unobserved) marginal costs be also increasing with training investment, and at a faster pace than marginal benefits.
Suppose now that educational attainment increases marginally over the sample mean. Since the marginal benefits of training are higher for the better educated, a marginal increase in education shifts the marginal benefits schedule upwards. For given marginal costs, the new training equilibrium occurs at a higher training investment, which is consistent with the results for OFFJT but inconsistent with the results for OJT. For this latter type of training, our empirical results show that the new equilibrium level of investment should be lower, not higher than the original level. An equilibrium with lower training intensity (incidence) can only be obtained in this framework if the marginal costs of training also increase when educational attainment is marginally increased above the mean.
The natural reason why marginal training costs increase for the better educated is that employees with higher education are more productive and thus have higher opportunity costs of the time spent receiving training. An alternative, but we believe less compelling, reason is that the better educated, who have higher cognitive skills, are either less willing or less able to master the practical skills associated to OJT, contrary to the view suggested by Thurow and Rosen.
Conclusions
In this paper we have used data from a survey of Thai employees to show that the relationship between education and training depends on the type of training. In particular, we have found that OJT is a substitute and OFFJT a complement to higher education. The negative relationship between educational attainment and OJT suggests that the firms in the sample have compensated the relative scarcity of human capital of the less educated with higher investment in on -the -job training.
This compensation might have been necessary, given the rapid growth of manufacturing in Thailand during the past twenty years, which has by far outpaced the growth of educational attainment.
When individuals with higher education are systematically more likely to receive employer -provided training, the skill gap with less educated individuals increase, with important consequences on the distribution of earnings. Widening differences in human capital can be a problem in a developing country, such as Thailand, with its relatively low educational attainment and its dispersed distribution of income. Our findings suggest that OJT in Thailand partially compensates the existing differences in educational attainment.
We have explained the negative relationship between education and OJT by arguing that the marginal costs of this type of training are higher for the better educated, who are more productive and therefore have higher opportunity costs of the time spent receiving training.
Since our sample is not representative of employment in Thailand, this paper should be considered as a case study of training in Thai manufacturing. As in most case studies, the relative advantage of detailed information on the relevant variables used in this study must be traded off with its lack of generality. Whether our results apply to the Thai economy as a whole is an open question that can only be addressed with better data. 
